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CHANGING CRITERIA FOR JUDGING JUDGES
Judith Resnik *
Professor Nagel and I agree that it is "appropriate" ' (in his words)
that the Senate play a role in the confirmation process. We part com-
pany on the desirability of senatorial involvement. This brief essay ex-
plains why I am unpersuaded by Professor Nagel's negative view of the
utility of a senatorial role and what benefits I see flowing from the Sen-
ate's scrutiny, over the past few years, of Presidential nominees.
The United States Constitution states that the President shall ap-
point judges-"by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate .... -2
As Charles Black explained some years ago, there are no "textual," no
"structural," no "prudential," or no "historical" reasons to object to sen-
ators understanding the words of the Constitution-"advice and con-
sent"-to authorize them to take a role beyond rubber stamping
Presidential appointments.3
While sharing Professor Black's view that no constitutional impedi-
ments can be found to a senatorial role in the nomination process, Nagel
nonetheless raises concerns about that role. Essentially, his claim is that
senators ought to be wary of too much involvement in the nomination
process. Nagel argues that while senators can (at a constitutional level)
screen candidates, senators should not (at a practical level)-because of
several problems that he identifies.
At its heart, Nagel's thesis is reminiscent of what law professors
used to call "institutional competency". 4 Nagel asserts that the Senate,
as an institution, will not be very good at screening and that screening
will not be very good for the Senate or the country-for five reasons:
because (1) the Senate will lack the energy to screen in a consistent and
* Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. My thanks
to the participants in the symposium and to Joan Schaffner. I also appreciate the assistance of the
editors of the Northwestern Law Review and their willingness to permit me to depart from legal
footnote conventions and to provide the first and last names of authors. Using only last names not
only limits access (when authors have common names) and often relies upon reader recognition of
those already well known, but also assumes that gender is irrelevant. The provision of first initials
for those who write books, but not articles, privileges one form of writing over another.
1 Robert Nagel, Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 Nw. U.L. Rv. 858 (1990).
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
3 Charles Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J.
657, 664 (1970), quoted in Nagel, supra note 1, at 861.
4 See Henry Hart and Albert Sachs, Legal Process Materials (unpublished materials used in
teaching law students) (on file with the author).
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even-handed fashion; 5 (2) the Senate will have varying amounts of infor-
mation about candidates; 6 (3) such screening will create incentives to
pick individuals that the Senate cannot attack;7 (4) screening will en-
hance the power of law professors;" and (5) screening puts senators in an
inappropriate role and deflects their attention from the more important
task of considering the work of the Court as a whole.9
The first two claims, about energy and information, require more
analysis. My sense is that Nagel is correct that the Senate's attention will
not be consistently focused upon nominations and that, as public choice
theorists have instructed us, agendas will have an impact; some nominees
will get more scrutiny than others and some nominees will present a
fuller record than others.10 But the twin problems of energy and infor-
mation are not only problems for the Senate; these are also problems for
the Executive. Some nominations are made quickly, with less informa-
tion than may be desirable, and some of the nominees are "unknown
quantities" in major respects. Given the problems of energy and infor-
mation, and given my assumption that these problems exist for both the
Senate and the Executive, a bit of redundancy-two institutions looking
instead of one-may well be desirable." Further, the threat of Senate
scrutiny may increase the pressure on the Executive to be more thorough
in its selection processes.
That brings me to Nagel's third objection, that the basis on which
senators reject individuals may lead to the nomination of particular kinds
of candidates.12 Nagel claims that nominees have something that he calls
(but does not define) "qualifications," on the one hand and then some-
thing else, which he terms "beliefs and probable voting patterns on the
Court."' 13 I am puzzled by his distinction between "qualifications" and
"beliefs." I am not troubled by either the Senate or the Presidency un-
derstanding that a nominee's qualifications entail her or his beliefs and
ideology. Nagel suggests that senatorial inquiry into beliefs may prompt
presidents to look for nominees whose beliefs are not known.14 I agree
with Nagel that presidents may try to find individuals whose "beliefs"
are less well known-less stated, less written, less available to an inquir-
5 Nagel, supra note 1, at 868-69.
6 Id. at 869.
7 Id. at 870.
8 Id. at 871.
9 Id. at 874.
10 Id. at 868-69.
11 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).
12 Nagel, supra note 1, at 870.
13 Id. at 859.
14 Id. at 870.
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ing Senate. 15 But I am not sure that such people are, as a category, less
desirable candidates for federal judgeships. Who are the individuals who
are the most visibly committed on legal issues? In addition to politicians,
it is we, law professors, who make our living by writing articles about
what we think law is and should be. It is not obvious to me that some of
us, law professors who have spent our lives trying to develop theories of
judging, are necessarily the best suited to be judges.
Much of judging, even at the Supreme Court level, is trying hard not
to make global theoretical statements about the meaning and nature of
what law is and should be, but rather, trying to decide cases in context-
cases generated from human beings, in dispute, in discord, in pain.
Those who are experienced theorists, (ie., law professors) about the
meaning of the law are not necessarily or presumptively those who are
good at responding to human beings in dispute. Hence, a selection pro-
cess that selects fewer people who have written grand theory is not in-
trinsically objectionable. 1 6
Of course, this comment has relevance to Nagel's next concern: that
senatorial screening unduly enhances the power of law professors.1 7 As
an empirical matter, I think Nagel is wrong-about law professor power
and law professor interests. First, the power point. Law professors' dis-
tress about the nomination of Robert Bork to the United States Supreme
Court was not pivotal but useful. While concerns about the Bork nomi-
nation were cast in terms of legal doctrine, the reason for the political
struggle was the perception that Bork in a series of articles and opinions
spanning two decades, was unsympathetic to the problems faced by
blacks, women, the poor, and civil rights plaintiffs. The nomination of
Robert Bork was rejected, in my view, because his statements came to
represent a vision of the Constitution that the Senate (sensitive to the
political goals and political power of those groups) rejected.
Second, the issue of law professors' interests. As a group, it is far
easier for we who are law professors to support the legal elite than to
oppose it---especially when those nominated are our former colleagues,
15 Id. at 870 ('nominees have a natural advantage if their views on these subjects are difficult to
ascertain").
16 One caveat may be in order. Another category of people whose views may be relatively more
available than others are judges on lower federal or on state courts--who have, by the nature of the
work, written opinions justifying their judgments. Assuming one wants judicial experience for some
members of the Supreme Court and other federal courts, then one would want to include lower
federal court and state court judges in the pool of individuals who might be nominated. If one
believed further that senatorial screening will eliminate these individuals, there would be more cause
for concern. However, I do not think that the recent nomination debates demonstrate that opinion
writing will be a frequent source of disqualification. Critics of the nomination of then-Judge Bork
were inspired not only by his written opinions, but also by the wealth of articles and speeches he
made as a law professor and social commentator. Further, the subsequent nomination and confirma-
tion of then-Judge Kennedy indicates that writing opinions is not as much of a problem as presenting
oneself as the expositor of a set of views that one hopes to put into place as a judge.
17 Nagel, supra note 1, at 871.
84:889 (1990)
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friends, or acquaintances. There is no joy in disagreeing, loudly and in
public, with those with whom one has worked. Moreover, the shared
work makes it difficult to disagree. Third, I think the pressure on presi-
dents to look outside the legal academy for judges reduces the actual
influence of law professors. Law professors may testify, may brief sena-
tors, but if not actually being the judges then law professors have no
power to decide cases and to transform lives in the direct and immediate
way that belongs to the office of the judge.
Nagel's next claim is that when senators screen, they and their lan-
guage are transformed; they move from being political actors, engaged in
political discourse, to assume the role of judge and to engage in "legal-
ized discourse."18 Here again, I am unclear about the distinction
drawn-between "legal" discourse and "political" discourse.1 9 Neither
phrase is defined nor explained.20 Nagel claims that there is something
problematic about senators talking about and asking questions about
constitutional interpretation and the law.21 I do not know why senatorial
efforts to talk about law is any different than senatorial efforts to under-
stand missile systems, foreign policy, or the needs of the homeless. To
legislate, senators need information, which in turn requires reliance on
staff and witnesses. Given the range of topics about which senators must
make decisions, we can expect that they will almost always be at a disad-
vantage as compared to the witnesses who testify before them and who
are, by definition, expert in an area. Most senators will not be as able to
engage in as nuanced a conversation as will the witnesses examined, but
that does not disqualify the Senate from making decisions in a variety of
areas.
At the heart of Professor Nagel's conceptualization is a claim that
"the legal culture is properly concerned with ideas"22 and in politics,
ideas and justifications matter less and "consequences ... the everyday
effects of abstractions" are what is relevant.23 Nagel may be right that
the "legal culture" of law schools is concerned about ideas, but he is
wrong (in my judgment) about the "legal culture" of judges. Cases are
not only about ideas; cases are also about people. People in disputes.
Cases are about ideas and about "the everyday effects of abstractions,"
the "consequences." I want judges to be keenly aware that their job is
practical, is (in Nagel's terms) "political," is about everyday effects and
everyday consequences. Hence, the very objection Nagel raises to sena-
torial screening is for me one of its great advantages. Moreover, to the
extent Nagel seems surprised that so much energy is focused upon partic-
18 Id. at 870.
19 Id.
20 Nagel's phrase is the "legalization of political discourse." Id. at 871.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 874.
23 Id.
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ular nominations and not on the institution of the Court as a whole, I
think his surprise is unfair. For me, the lessons of the last two decades-
of Watergate, the Iran Contra dispute, and the Supreme Court-are that
individuals matter a good deal. The constraints one might have thought
existed by virtue of legal documents such as the Constitution and statutes
and by virtue of institutional arrangements do not seem, in fact, always
to constrain. At bottom, it is the people that count enormously. Hence
the pressure to look hard and the emotional involvement in who will be
our spokespersons and our judges.
Rather than be distressed about senatorial screening, I believe there
are reasons to be cautiously optimistic about its impact on judicial nomi-
nees, on the institution of the Senate, and on the country as a whole. I
know the sample size is small, the history recent, and that generalizations
must be carefully bracketed with caveats, but let me conclude by sug-
gesting that the debate that surrounded Robert Bork and to a lesser ex-
tent, Anthony Kennedy, demonstrates that senatorial screening has had
a positive effect on the stated aspirations for our judges.
Two new qualifications seem to be emerging: that the nominee ex-
press identification of and compassion and concern for the difficulties
faced by those who appear before him or her, and that the nominee take
women seriously as political and social beings. I was one of many who
testified against the nomination of Robert Bork. One of my objections to
his nomination was that, upon reading many of his opinions in the field
of my expertise and when listening to him testify, I found that he seemed
uninterested (in published decisions and in his testimony) in the plight of
the litigants before him. While I, and others, criticized Judge Bork for a
lack of expressed sensitivity, we had few learned legal opinions to cite for
the propositions that judges, and specifically Supreme Court Justices, are
supposed to speak about the plight of those who come before them, to
acknowledge the connection between the painful problems faced by the
litigants and the claims of legal right, to discuss judges' obligations of
compassion.
I am pleased to report that, today, there is support, in cases and
commentary, for the proposition that judges should be compassionate.
Justice Brennan has published a lecture in which he speaks of that re-
quirement. 24 During the course of the debate on his qualifications,
Anthony Kennedy described a "good judge" as a person who had "com-
passion, warmth, sensitivity and an unyielding insistence on justice. '25
In 1989, Justice Blackmun wrote, in dissent, about the requirement that
judges render "'sympathetic' reading[s] ... that comportf with dictates
of fundamental justice and recognized that compassion need not be ex-
24 William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion and the "Progress of Law," 42D REC. OF THE ASS'N
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 948, 950 (Dec. 1987).
25 See Nominee to Court Says Judges Should Avoid Making Policy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1987, at
A26, col. 1.
84:889 (1990)
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iled from the province ofjudging. ' 26 I think that the nomination debates
of 1987 helped to make plain that compassion is a "qualification," a "be-
lief," a part of the "ideology" to be required of those selected to don the
robes of judge.
One might have thought that seeking compassionate or sympathetic
judges would be uncontroversial, but it is not. Yet, more difficult is figur-
ing out what impact such "compassion" or "sympathy" should have, as
more than a decade of jurisprudence on the eighth amendment (inter
alia) demonstrates. 27 But bringing in those emotional and moral states
as relevant is an important step in considering what their impact should
be. Flippancy about sympathy or about the categories of individuals or
activities to whom courts have or have not extended protection belies a
fear of the emotive28 and suggests that legal rules operate unaffected by
human emotive responses. Fear of the connected and obligatory aspects
of judging does not prevent emotion from operating in the course ofjudg-
ment but inhibits conversations about what scope to give that emotion in
the context of adjudication.29
The second qualification that is emerging is about nominees' atti-
tudes about women. Not very long ago, it was permissible discourse-
both "legal" and "political," in Nagel's terms-to trivialize women and
the problems that face us. We heard such trivialization during the Bork
hearings. For example, one of the controversial decisions of then-Judge
Bork (as a member of a panel of judges on the Court of Appeals for the
26 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1012 (1989).
27 In the 1970s, the Supreme Court "recognized that 'sympathy' is an important ingredient in
the eighth amendment's requirement of an individualized sentencing determination." Saffle v. Parks,
110 S. Ct. 1257, 1273 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Some members of the Court have attempted
to distinguish "a moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant" from "an emotional response to
the mitigating evidence." California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, ., concurring).
The latter, according to a recent Supreme Court majority in Saffle, "is more likely to depend on that
juror's own emotions than on the actual evidence regarding crime and the defendant" and thus to
compromise reliability and nonarbitrariness. Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1262. In Saffle, the trial judge had
instructed the jury to "avoid any influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice, or other arbi-
trary factor when imposing sentence." Id. at 1259. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit stated that the 1987 California v. Brown case had "implicitly suggested that sympathy that is
based on the evidence is a valid consideration in sentencing that cannot constitutionally be pre-
cluded." Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1553 (10th Cir. 1988) rev'd sub nom., Saffle v. Parks, 110
S. Ct. 1257 (1990). The Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief on retroactivity. While the
majority did not address the question of sympathy instructions on the merits, the majority registered
concern about the use of "sympathy."
28 I do not share Nagel's view of the ramifications for politicians of supporting judicial protec-
tion of gay and lesbian rights on the one hand and of "obscene" materials on the other. While
fighting "obscenity" may still look politically popular (see UPI, Governor Takes Credit for Rapper's
Arrests, L.A. Times, June 11, 1990, at 8, col. 3.), many politicians are seeking to affiliate with the
concerns of lesbians and gays. See, eg., Victor F. Zonana, The Gay Vote is Hotly Pursued in Gover-
nor's Race, L.A. Times, May 20, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
29 See generally Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations of our
Judges, 61 So. CAL. L. Rav. 1877 (1988).
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District of Columbia) involved jobs at a factory that exposed workers to
chemicals that might harm reproduction. 30 The company had a policy
that, to continue working at such jobs, women of childbearing age would
have to be sterilized. Judge Bork wrote an opinion for a unanimous
three-judge court that concluded that the policy did not violate federal
law.31 The issue at the hearings on the Bork nomination was not
whether the opinion was correct as a matter of law, but whether the
opinion acknowledged the outrageous nature of the problem faced by
women workers: be fired or demoted or be sterilized. Judge Bork's opin-
ion noted that the company's plan was an attempt to deal with a "distres-
sing" problem, and that rather than fire the women, the company had
given them a "unhappy choice" of sterilization. 32 At the nomination
hearing there was controversy over Judge Bork's characterization of the
company's practice as a "choice" for women and about his comment that
"some of the [women] I guess didn't want to have children. ' 33
Discussion was also focused upon Griswold v. Connecticut,34 in
which the issue was whether a Connecticut statute, making it a crime to
proscribe contraceptives, was constitutional.35 Robert Bork described
Griswold as a "law professor's dream" and the statute as a "nutty"
law.36 Again, one had a sense that the nominee was, if not cavalier,
surely not somber about the realities of poor families' lives. While the
rich could find doctors to provide contraceptives or could go out of state,
the poor could not, and a clinic for poor women could not provide birth
control. (Indeed, Bob Nagel also claims that this case is "routinely de-
molished in first-year law school classrooms. ' 37 I know that at least
some law professors do not read Griswold as an opinion to be trivialized.)
Finally, in an opinion about sexual harassment, Judge Bork wrote of sex-
ual "dalliance[s]" 38 and "sexual escapades" 39-appearing to make light
of accusations of an atmosphere in which sexual compliance is required.
30 Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
31 Id. at 445.
32 Id. at 450.
33 Linda Greenhouse, Bork Sets Forth Spirited Defense of his Integrity, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19,
1987, at 1, col. 2.
34 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
35 CoNN. GEN. STAT. 53-32, 54-196 (1958), quoted in, Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
36 See Nomination of Robert H, Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Stuart
Taylor, Jr., Bork Tells Panel He is Not Liberal, Not Conservative, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1987, at Al,
col. 6. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut: Landmark Case Recalled, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1989,
at A6, col. 5.
37 Nagel, supra note 1, at 872.
38 Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting from the sugges-
tion for rehearing en bane); panel opinion affirmed in part and remanded in part sub nom. Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
39 Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1332.
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As Martin Shapiro has noted,40 feminists' voices were heard repeat-
edly during the Bork hearings. Many witnesses objected to the nominee's
trivializing responses and to his interpretations of constitutional doctrine
that would exclude women from the protection of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Months later, when Anthony Kennedy was nominated, questions
were asked about his involvement in clubs that excluded women. The
underlying issues were: what is this person's attitude toward women?
Does this nominee understand that women are and should be full partici-
pants in the political, economic, business, and social life of the commu-
nity and that problems of women are not occasions for jokes or
innuendoes? This concern about attitudes about women is reflected in
the more recent debate about John Tower's nomination to be Secretary of
Defense. A New York Times headline is illustrative. John Tower's
daughter proclaimed that her father "always treated women as equals. '41
For me, that treatment of women is relevant to the qualifications of nom-
inees-for judgeships and for other offices of the federal government-is
to be celebrated.
Senatorial involvement helped raise questions about equal treatment
and about the stance of judges toward the litigants before them. With
senatorial involvement and political debate, the criteria for choosing
judges have begun to shift. Under these newly developed criteria, Bruce
Ackerman's praise (echoed by Professor Nagel) of Robert Bork--one of
the "best qualified candidates for the Supreme Court of this or any other
era" 42-seems problematic. If the qualifications have in fact changed
over time, then it is unlikely that one is among the "best qualified... of
this and any other era." Our era has (happily in my view) redefined what
counts as "best qualified." If I am correct that these last nominations
have helped to create, reflect, and state new aspirations for judges, then,
for the institution of the Senate, for the nominees, and for the country,
senatorial screening is a step forward, to be greeted warmly, to be en-
couraged and supported.43
40 Martin Shapiro, Interest Groups and Supreme Court Appointments, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 935
(1990).
41 Maureen Dowd, Tower, With Family Near, Begins a Counterattack at the 11th Hour, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 6, 1989, at Al, col. 4, Bll, col. 2.
42 Nagel, supra note 1, at 859 (quoting Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1164 (1988)). Compare Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99
Yale L.J. 1419 (1990) (Book Review of Robert H. Bork's THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLIT-
ICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW).
43 Senatorial debates of nominee qualifications and beliefs will not always entail the development
of criteria that I personally endorse. The furor about the nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to the
Supreme Court is an example of a fight in which the "opposition couched its attack in terms of
questionable character and lack of judicial temperament, and occasionally anti-Semitism became
overt, but essentially the campaign against the nominee rested on the repugnance of his social and
economic views." Paul Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1146, 1151 (1988). That such debates sometimes occur in the context of nominations to the
Supreme Court or to lower federal courts is neither troubling nor surprising, for these are the issues
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with which the country is struggling and the federal courts participate in both shaping and reflecting
those battles. See Ackerman, supra note 43.
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